Turkish hypocrisy and the offer to open ports

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By Dr. Andrestinos N. Papadopoulos, Ambassador a.h.

Turkey’s EU minister Egemen Bagis’ recent statement that Ankara is ready to open all her airports, seaports and air space to Greek Cypriot planes and vessels, the minute a British Airways, an Air France, a KLM and a Lufthansa plane lands at Ercan airport was made merely to create an impression.
Hypocritically he stressed that this simple arrangement could help free up talks over Cyprus, was not meant to be a recognition of the TRNC and would have the character of a Taiwanese-style trade relationship.
The hypocrisy lies in the fact that the opening of the ports is an obligation of Turkey towards the EU in accordance with the Additional Protocol of Ankara. Moreover, the EU and its member states expect full, non-discriminatory implementation of the protocol and the removal of all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions of means of transport, by virtue of its Declaration of September 21, 2005 as well as the Accession Partnership.
It is of interest, however, to delve into the background. In a circular dated May 27, 1997, the Turkish government issued instructions to port and harbour authorities in Turkey to enforce a new set of restrictive measures for vessels sailing between ports in Cyprus, which are open to international maritime traffic, and ports and harbours in Turkey, irrespective of their registration. These restrictions, which constituted an escalation of measures imposed by Turkey since 1987, are discriminatory and affect shipping engaged in international trade. In fact, they impede freedom of navigation, transit, access to her ports and harbours, as well as equality of treatment.
The argument has been put forward that these restrictions were counter-measures against the Cyprus government’s decision in 1974 to declare all points of entry in the occupied areas as closed and illegal. This argument is not valid, as the Turkish embargo on Cypriot vessels and vessels serving Cypriot trade, was imposed in 1987, some 13 years after the Turkish invasion. It is worth mentioning that ports and airports in the government-controlled areas of Cyprus are open to all Turkish vessels and aircraft and that several of them have already called at Cypriot ports since the imposition of the Turkish embargo, with their numbers increasing considerably during 2009.
Another argument was that the embargo was imposed by Turkey for safety reasons, because of the continuing political controversy over the divided island. This argument is also not valid, because the Turkish government lifted the restrictions on cruise ships in 1997, as the financial losses incurred by the ban were bigger for Turkey than for Cyprus.
It is obvious that the Turkish measures on Cyprus were aimed at harming its economy. In fact, there have been negative effects. Cyprus’ share of the world shipping fleet shrank and the island’s importance as a transhipment hub was affected. The Cyprus ship management sector also incurred financial losses, because vessels managed by a company in Cyprus can either be arrested or delayed at Turkish ports. The measures have aggravated competitiveness problems faced by the European fleet from vessels registered in third countries, and the transit trade through Cypriot ports has seen an enormous reduction with annual losses of around 100 million.
Since Cyprus’ accession to the EU in 2004, the issue has gained a European dimension, as Turkish measures seriously hinder EU private and public interests, in particular those of ship-owners and ship managers. Moreover, these measures violate a series of legal acts, regulations, declarations, etc. It augers well that the EU General Affairs Council at its meeting of December 5, in its conclusions about Turkey reconfirms, interalia, its Declaration of September 21, 2005 and expresses its deep regret at Turkey’s refusal to implement fully the Additional Protocol of Ankara.
Concluding, we can observe that, yet again, Turkey remains faithful to her policy of first creating a fait accompli and then proposing its withdrawal, with a view to securing something in exchange.