Mari-Vassilikos Disaster: More Troubling Questions

By Dr Alan Waring

In the previous Risk Watch in last week’s Financial Mirror (‘A Gamble that Cost Lives’), I identified a number of key principles applicable to the safety of sites that make, handle or store explosive materials. In this article, I make further observations and comment on the Mari-Vassilikos disaster and, in particular, the applicability of relevant EU Directives as well as whether the official inquiries into the disaster are up to the task.

EU Major Hazards Directive
Following the Seveso disaster in Italy in 1976 and other disasters, the European Commission issued in 1982 its first directive on the prevention of major accidents involving dangerous substances in industrial settings. The so-called ‘Seveso Directive’ was later revised, strengthened and re-issued as EU Directive 96/82/EC in December 1996.
The Directive applies to specified dangerous substances listed in Annex 1 that are present in quantities that equal or exceed specified threshold amounts. Explosives are in the list. Presence includes processing, creation, use, handling and storage. However, although the scope excludes military establishments, installations or storage facilities among others, see later for how I argue that the Directive should nevertheless be applied to a Mari-Vassilikos context.
For sites where the Directive applies, the Member State government “shall ensure that the operator is obliged to take all measures necessary to prevent major accidents and to limit their consequences for man and the environment”. Among obligations of operators is the requirement (Article 7) to draw up, maintain and revise as necessary a Major Accident Prevention Policy (MAPP) “designed to guarantee a high level of protection for man and the environment by appropriate means, structures and management systems”. Note the word ‘guarantee’. Proximity of other sites, especially if they also have major hazards, must be addressed in order to prevent a domino effect (Article 8) and the public must be suitably informed. Operators must prepare, review and revise as necessary a detailed safety report (Article 9) demonstrating: the effectiveness of the MAPP and its associated safety management system, as detailed in Annex III; systematic identification and assessment of major hazards and the corresponding safety measures; adequate safety and reliability in the design, construction, operation and maintenance of any installation, storage facility, equipment infrastructure relevant to major hazards; and adequate internal and external emergency plans.

Should the EU Directive Have Applied to Mari-Vassilikos?
Owing to the quite large quantity thresholds cited in Annex I, the number of sites to which the Major Hazards Directive strictly applies is limited. However, for those sites containing dangerous substances in smaller but still significant quantities, other EU Directives such as the Safety & Health at Work Framework Directive 89/391 EC will apply. In the UK, for example, generally it has been accepted that major hazard sites that fall outside the scope of Directive 96/82 EC (e.g. because of lower inventories and/or disapplication) should nevertheless adopt voluntarily the requirements of 96/82 as the ‘nearest relevant best practice standard’ so as to achieve comparable levels of protection and therefore compliance with the general safety & health Directives. This means having a MAPP, SMS, risk assessments, emergency plans etc. I myself was involved with a number of such evaluations for UK sites under the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations.
So, I would argue that even though the EU Major Hazards Directive per se may not have applied to the Mari Naval Base storage facility, the basic principles and elements of that Directive should still have been implemented. Furthermore, the Vassilikos power station (built over the period 2001-2009) should also have followed the same principles owing to significant bulk storage of flammable liquid fuel. In addition, a gas terminal is proposed to be added to the power station site, which would give further good reason to follow the Major Hazards Directive principles. Indeed, Article 12 requires Member States to ensure that land-use planning takes full account of proximity of sites, separation distances, residential areas etc.
Key questions that the official inquiries should address include:
• Did the EU Major Hazards Directive 96/82EC apply to either the Mari naval base and/or the EAC Vassilikos power station site?
• If Yes, was the Directive fully implemented and if not why not?
• If No, was the Directive nonetheless implemented as ‘nearest relevant best practice standard’ and if not why not?
• For both sites, what evidence is there of a competent MAPP, SMS, risk assessments and actions taken to mitigate those risks?
• Were the internal and external emergency plans of both sites up to scratch and did they function effectively?
• Did the decision to locate the Vassilikos power station next to the Mari naval base take account of a competent risk evaluation, including collateral damage and domino effects?
• Will a competent major hazards risk evaluation be done for the replacement power station and where will it be located? – presumably not at Vassilikos.

Will the Official Inquiries Get to the Truth?
In my previous article, I argued strongly for a full, independent and wide-ranging public inquiry into this disaster. However, the Cyprus Attorney General has stated that such a searching inquiry would be too difficult for a small country like Cyprus to organize and is not justified. Being a small country did not stop Singapore, for example, from conducting the very searching Nicoll Highway Collapse Inquiry – but hey, I was forgetting etzi ine tin Kypros!
There will be two parallel inquiries. The police will conduct a criminal investigation to establish whether any laws have been broken and whether any criminal proceedings are warranted. Unfortunately, despite their general competence, it is doubtful that they will possess the technical knowledge and forensic expertise required for this specialized task. In the UK, the police work closely with technical experts from the Health & Safety Executive on major accident investigations but no such comparable body to the HSE exists in Cyprus. Perhaps experts can be supplied via the European Commission or the HSE to assist the police investigation.
The other inquiry, which will seek to identify causes and accountabilities, will be conducted by an experienced lawyer Mr Polys Polyviou and will, according to the Attorney General, ‘examine this catastrophe in its entirety’. With no disrespect intended, as Mr Polyviou’s expertise lies in banking and finance law, is he really the most suitable candidate for this investigation, which will involve considerable understanding of industrial and technical forensic matters? Also, a multi-disciplinary investigation team is warranted, not a single person.
What is really required for an inquiry of this kind is an experienced judge who has headed major forensic investigations. Two who immediately come to mind are Judge Richard Goldstone from South Africa who has headed UN war crimes tribunals and Lord Cullen, a former Lord Justice General of Scotland, who headed the public inquiries into the Piper Alpha offshore installation disaster and the Ladbroke Grove Rail Disaster. Both have impeccable credentials and a reputation for getting to the truth of complex matters with a no-nonsense efficiency. Coming from outside Cyprus, either would provide that crucial independence that this inquiry will require if it is to enjoy the full trust and confidence of the victim’s families and the population at large. Sadly, this is not to be.

Dark Clouds of Recession
Businesses in Cyprus are already experiencing a sharp revenue and efficiency downturn and increased costs resulting from the disaster. The Financial Mirror and most pundits predict a recession will follow. Former Finance Minister Mr Sarris predicts government belt tightening will have to be far more severe than proposed before the disaster. Cyprus banks have just passed the ECB ‘stress tests’ but, as these were conducted before the disaster, are they now a reliable predictor of their robustness? A credible public inquiry is vital to restore public and investor trust and confidence.